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The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of
Environmental Protection: A Primer
Denis Binder*
INTRODUCTION
The last third of the Twentieth Century witnessed a veritable
explosion of environmental legislation. While some environmental statutes harken back a century,1 indeed long before the word
“environmental”2 was conceived, most environmental legislation
started emerging in the late 1960’s, highlighted by the enactment
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA).3
The statutes may be widely known and of broad applicability,
such as the Clean Air Act,4 Clean Water Act,5 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),6 Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),7 NEPA,
and the Endangered Species Act,8 or of specific application, such
as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),9 or
of little public familiarity, such as the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1970.10
As the number of statutes approach the century mark, little
thought has been given by Congress to the constitutional basis of
the legislation. The underlying assumption is that the Commerce
* Professor of Law, Chapman University. A.B. 1967, J.D. 1970, University of San
Francisco; L.L.M. 1971, S.J.D. 1973, University of Michigan. Professor Binder gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Rosa E. Sahagun, a second year law student at Chapman, for her invaluable assistance in preparing this article. Professor Binder also wishes
to thank Professor Celestine McConville for her insightful comments.
1 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1986), was enacted to maintain the navigability of bodies of water. It became a major source of environmental protection through much of the Twentieth Century. Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1986), which required a permit for obstructions to navigation, was the predecessor to the permit provisions of section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(1986). Section 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1986), was commonly referred to as the “Refuse Act.”
2 Professor Rodgers, in a recent article, traces the phrase “environmental law” back
to the 1960’s. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: “The Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1995).
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1986).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1995).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995).
8 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1986).
9 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2000).
10 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1986).
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Clause11 grants virtually carte blanche authority to Congress to
legislate for environmental protection.
Indeed, because environmental problems often transcend artificial political boundaries, such as state borders,12 only Congress
can comprehensively address major environmental problems. Yet,
the environmental statutes have been stretched further and further until they have been applied to isolated wetlands13 and isolated endangered species.14 Even Congress has pushed the
jurisdictional envelope to the extremes. For example, the Clean
Water Act dispenses with the traditional tests of commerce, such
as “navigability,” and instead uses as its definition “waters of the
United States.”15
Often overlooked since the broad expansion of federal powers
during wartime, the New Deal, and the Great Society,16 is that
pursuant to the United States Constitution, the federal government is a government based on enumerated powers, rather than a
government of omnipotent power. The requisite granting powers
may be derived from several provisions of the Constitution, such
as the Commerce Clause, the Property Clause,17 the Taxation

11 The Commerce Clause allows Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
13 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (Jan. 9, 2001).
14 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
15 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1986).
16 With the understandable exception of vast wartime increases in federal power,
President Roosevelt’s New Deal ushered in modern government with broad regulatory powers and ever-expansive budgets. The “Great Society” was President Johnson’s anti-poverty
program, consisting of new and vastly expanded program.
17 The Property Clause provides “the Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The federal government owns
approximately one-third of the nation’s land. See Public Land Law Review Commission,
One Third of the Nation’s Land: A Report to the President and to the Congress (1970). For
example, the federal government controls roughly 44.3% of California’s total acreage of
100,206,720 acres. Id. at 377. The corresponding figure for Nevada is 86.4%. Id. The Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 429 U.S. 529, 540 (1976), clearly articulated that the
United States acts both as a proprietor and in a legislative capacity over its lands. The
United States is free to develop, not develop, control, and regulate development on its lands
as it wishes, subject to the limiting provisions of the Constitution, id. It may, therefore,
ban or limit the use of motorized boats, snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, or off-road vehicles on its lands, id. It may allow or restrict the harvesting of federal timber resources, or
the development or mining of other resources, such as oil and gas, id. It may regulate
recreational activities in the nation’s forests, parks, and deserts, id. Unless the federal
government clearly, unequivocally waives sovereign immunity, it is not bound by state law.
See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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Clause,18 and the Spending Clause.19
The Commerce Clause was viewed not so long ago as a grant
of plenary authority. However, the seemingly inexorable rise of
federal hegemony and the corresponding eclipse of state sovereignty has been called into question by a series of 5-4 Supreme
Court decisions granting the states’ rights with a concomitant
diminution of federal power.20 Of particular note are the cases of
United States v. Lopez,21 dealing with the Gun Free School Zone
Act of 1990, and United States v. Morrison,22 addressing the Violence Against Women Act. Both cases involved the Supreme
Court, again by narrow 5-4 decisions, striking down federal statutes on the ground that an insufficient nexus existed between the
proscribed acts and interstate commerce. The current Supreme
Court is unwilling to interpret the Commerce Clause and congressional creativity to transform incidental effects on interstate commerce into a carte blanche grant of regulatory power to Congress.
However, Congress may be able to accomplish many of the
same legislative goals by expressly basing jurisdiction on the
Spending Clause. This provision grants Congress broad powers to
18 “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. With the major exception of “Superfund,”
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1995), the Taxation Clause has not been widely utilized to further environmental objectives. Under Superfund, the government when necessary may effectuate a
cleanup of hazardous substances through a fund created pursuant to CERCLA. Superfund
is funded through a tax on the petrochemical industry, utilities, and crude oil importers,
and through reimbursement from responsible parties. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 9611-12,
9631-33, 9661-62, 9671-72 (1995).
On the other hand, a sulfur emissions tax on power plant emissions, The Pure Air Tax
Act, was proposed in 1972 by President Nixon, but shortly disappeared from the political
radar screen. Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of “Green Taxes” A Tribute to Senator
John Heinz, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 36 (1992). President Clinton’s proposed BTU
tax on energy consumption was defeated in 1993, although other tax increases were
approved.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
20 See especially the Tenth Amendment case, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and the Eleventh Amendment cases, Alden v. Main, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), College
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), and
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1 (1989)). The Eleventh Amendment creates a form of state sovereign immunity
by precluding lawsuits against states in federal court. The Supreme Court in Seminole
Tribe held the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the power to abrogate a state’s
sovereign immunity. For general discussions of the Eleventh Amendment, see William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983), and John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing
the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1999).
21 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(25)(B) (2000), created a federal offense for knowingly possessing a firearm within
1,000 feet of a school.
22 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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achieve its goals.23 Indeed, conditions on grants can be traced
back to the Hatch Act of 1877.24
PARAMETERS

OF THE

SPENDING CLAUSE

The Supreme Court decided in South Dakota v. Dole25 that
Congress could condition the receipt of federal highway funds
upon states raising the minimum drinking age to twenty-one.
South Dakota argued the condition violated both the Spending
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment.26
The Court’s interpretation of the Spending Clause was based
on an earlier case, United States v. Butler.27 The Butler Court
held Congress was not limited by the direct grants of legislative
power found in the Constitution in authorizing funds.28 Congress’s powers under the Spending Clause were not thereby limited to the other enumerated powers. Congress is free, therefore,
to condition the receipt of federal funds upon compliance with federal statutes and administrative directives.29
The expansive interpretation of the Spending Clause has not
been universally acclaimed. For example, Professor Baker argues
the Spending Clause should be construed in congruence with the
Commerce Clause and should not be stretched broader than the
other enumerated Article I powers.30 She asserts the Dole test
should be replaced by a rule that would invalidate any attempt by
Congress to regulate states in a manner that Congress could not
directly mandate.
The spending power is not unlimited. Several limitations exist. First, spending must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.”31
Courts should generally defer substantially to Congress’s judg23 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism after United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 793 (1996).
24 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 361-390(d) (1999); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty; The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 871 n.144 (1979). This statute required
annual financial reports from agriculture experimentation stations. Id. Truly, big trees
can grow out of small acorns.
25 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
26 Id. at 205.
27 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
28 Id. at 66.
29 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
30 See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1916, 1962-63 (1995). See also Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal
Welfare Legislation; Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 122 (1998); Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the
Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1434 (1994).
31 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (explaining courts should substantially defer to Congress’s judgment in determining if an expenditure is in pursuit of the general welfare).
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ment in determining whether the expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes.32
Second, Congress’s intent to condition funds in a particular
action must be articulated and unambiguous “enabl[ing] the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequence of their participation.”33 Legislation pursuant to the
Spending Clause can be analogized to a contract. The states agree
to federally imposed conditions in exchange for the receipt of federal funds. Therefore, the disclosure of conditions must be unambiguous.34 Precision is especially critical because the fundamental
constitutional sovereignty of the federal and state governments is
at issue. In this respect, Professor Engdahl posits that “sufficient
clarity is required not only as to the fact that an obligation is being assumed, but also as to the scope or scale of that obligation.”35
Third, the conditions on federal funds must be reasonably related to the articulated grant;36 a valid exercise of the Spending
Clause occurs when Congress conditions the receipt of federal
funds in a way reasonably calculated to address the “particular
impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended.”37
Finally, other Constitutional provisions may bar the conditional grant of federal funds.38 Dole construed this limitation to
mean Congress cannot use the Spending Clause to induce states
to engage in conduct that would otherwise be unconstitutional.39
The Dole majority acknowledged that in some undefined circumstances, the financial inducements might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion.”40 The
federal government may not condition the receipt of funds in such
a way as to leave the state with no practical alternative but to
comply with the federal standards.
The links in Dole between raising the drinking age to twentyone, Congress’s purpose of safe interstate travel and the expenditures of federal highway funds seemed clear. However, Justice
O’Connor’s dissent viewed the statute as an attempt to regulate
the sale of liquor, which laid outside Congress’s legislative powers
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. The Supreme Court, though, does not require exact
specificity. In Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 665, 665-66 (1985), the Court
held Congress simply has to put the party accepting federal funds on notice of its prescribed or proscribed conduct.
35 David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 78 (1994).
36 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
37 Dole, 483 U.S. at 209.
38 See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
39 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
40 Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). For a
detailed analysis of the coercion issue, see Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding
Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 172 (2001).
32
33
34
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because of the Twenty-First Amendment.41 Justice O’Connor also
felt the drinking age conditions were “far too over and under
inclusive.”42
The coercion theory was tested by the Ninth Circuit in Nevada v. Skinner,43 which involved a challenge to the federally
mandated speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.44 Nevada
claimed the potential loss of ninety-five percent of its highway
funds deprived it of any choice, forcing it to adhere to the national
speed limit.
The Skinner court felt the difficulty of assessing a state’s financial capabilities “renders the coercion theory highly suspect as
a method for resolving disputes between federal and state governments.”45 This approach has been followed by other courts.46 As a
practical matter, federal courts have been reluctant to invalidate
funding conditions.47
However, the court did not base its opinion on the coercion
theory. Instead, it held the Congressional statute could be independently supported by another enumerated power, the Commerce Clause.48 Congress clearly has the power to enact a
uniform speed limit pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The
threatened withholding of substantial highway funds is in fact a
lesser form of coercion than the direct, federal enactment of a flat
mandate.49
The Skinner court, in a significant footnote, saw no need to
“min[e] history” for evidence of legislative intent.50 Indeed, the
court held Congress was not required to identify the precise source
of its authority in enacting legislation. Rather, the court’s task is
to determine if Congress acted within its authority. The court emphasized Congress can use its spending power to encourage states
to participate in voluntary and cooperative ventures within the
parameters of the Commerce Clause.51
41 The Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed prohibition, gave great powers to
the states to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. See U.S CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
42 Dole, 483 U.S. at 214-15.
43 884 F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
44 The 55 mph speed limit was enacted in 1973 as part of the Emergency Highway
Conservation Act. States were required to impose the 55 mph speed limit or risk losing
95% of federal highway funds on all highways. Id.
45 Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448.
46 See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2000); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (complaining about federal mandates for illegal aliens); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996); Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp.
1320, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
47 See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F. 3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir 2000).
48 The court deferred to the congressional findings of fact. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 451.
49 Id. at 449.
50 Id. at 448 n.8.
51 Id. at 448.
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Dole did not specify the degree of relationship necessary to
pass muster under the Spending Clause. The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed in New York v. United States52 that the conditions on receipt of federal funds must bear “some relationship”53
to the purpose of the funding.
The Court upheld the use of Congress’s spending powers in an
effort to solve the nation’s nuclear waste disposal problems, but
struck down a “Take Title” provision pursuant to which states
would have to take title to the commercial nuclear wastes in their
states unless a solution was reached.
A critical Tenth Amendment holding by the Court found Congress lacks the power to direct state legislatures to implement
programs under the Commerce Clause. Congress cannot directly
compel states to implement state action plans or submit to administering federal regulatory programs, regardless of the paramount national interest.
New York v. United States illustrates Congress may choose
from a wide range of options in preserving the public safety and
environmental protection. It could, for example, condition the receipt of federal funds upon a state’s voluntary submission to a condition. It might also directly regulate activities within the
confines of the Commerce Clause.
What Congress cannot do, however, is mandate states exercise their police power or enact legislation. It can encourage, but
not compel, the states to exercise their police power.
Congress also may not mandate state and local officials to
carry out federal enforcement activities. For example, in Printz v.
United States,54 the Supreme Court struck down a provision in the
Brady Bill,55 which required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on proposed handgun transfers. The statute placed local law enforcement officers in charge of
the mandated background checks.56
Therefore, while Congress can provide grants to states with
rationally related conditions attached, it cannot directly mandate
states exercise, in any way, their police powers.
The expansive interpretation of the Spending Clause allows
Congress to accomplish many goals it might otherwise be precluded from achieving. First, it can extend federal environmental
jurisdiction past the limits of the Commerce Clause if states cooperate. For example, even if Congress cannot regulate isolated wetlands, states might be induced to act. Congress may condition the
52
53
54
55
56

505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 167.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994)
Id. at § 922(s)(2).
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grants on the state’s exercise of police power in areas the federal
government cannot directly reach. Second, a state may waive its
sovereign immunity. Congress can condition the receipt of federal
funds upon a state’s waiver of immunity,57 exposing the state to
citizen suit provisions common in federal environmental statutes.58 Congress can thereby require, for example, adequate provisions for judicial review. The mere acceptance, though, of
federal funding does not result in the waiver of a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity.59
REMEDIES

FOR

VIOLATIONS

The typical remedy for enforcement of spending conditions is
for the federal government to terminate funds to the violator,60
and to recover amounts spent contrary to the terms of the grant.61
Similarly, a private party may have to return the funds and can be
denied participation in the program.62 Violators may also be
barred from receiving additional federal funds or participating in
other programs.63
RESCISSION

OF

CONSENT

One issue that arises is whether a state may withdraw its
consent. Presumably, a state cannot rescind its consent for funds
it is currently receiving from the federal government. However, a
state might try to prospectively rescind its consent or attempt to
return the funds previously received. No direct authority exists,
but analogous situations shed light on the issue.
57 See, e.g., Clark v. California, 123 F. 3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied., 524 U.S.
937 (1998); Tennessee Dep’t of Human Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.
1992); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 21 B.R. 993 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
58 Congress included “citizen suit” provisions in many of the major environmental
statutes beginning with the Clean Air Act in 1970. Under these statutes, “any person” may
sue “any person” alleged to be in violation of the statute. These suits may be brought
against state officials alleged to be violating the statutes. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
although a suit cannot be directly brought against a state pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment, under the doctrine established in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), suit
can be brought against individually named state officials). For a general discussion of citizen suits, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000), and Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1995).
59 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
60 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
61 See, e.g., Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 663 (1985).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915. (7th Cir. 2000).
63 For example, under the “Swampbuster” provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985,
16 U.S.C. § 3821 (2000), farm subsidies are barred for farmers who grow crops on converted
wetlands. See Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915.
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In North Dakota v. United States,64 the state attempted to
withdraw its approval for easement acquisitions by the United
States. The Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act65 authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire easements over wetlands suitable for waterfowl breeding and nesting grounds.66 However, the
statute precluded federal acquisitions without the approval of the
Governor or an appropriate agency of the state where the land is
located.67 Roughly 1.5 million acres were acquired in North Dakota between 1961 and 1977 with the approval of successive
governors.68
In the 1970’s, the spirit of cooperation between North Dakota
and the federal government broke down when North Dakota
sought the equivalent of a divorce by withdrawing its approval.
North Dakota argued the Governor’s consent was revocable at
will. The federal government countered that once a state gave
permission, “the role assigned to the state by Congress has been
exhausted.”69
The Supreme Court agreed with the government. Legislative
history did not indicate Congress intended a state’s consent was
revocable. In addition, the acquisition program could only take
place over several years. Consent, once given by the state, cannot
be revoked because the statute does not provide for revocation.
The Supreme Court was concerned that a “detailed federal program involving the estimate of needs, setting of priorities, allocation of funds, and negotiations with landowners” could be nullified
in an instant by a state’s governor.70
A highway dispute from thirty years ago also sheds light on
the issue. The state of Texas wanted to extend a highway from
the San Antonio Airport into downtown San Antonio. The route
would go through Brackenridge-Olmos Basin Parklands. The
road was planned before enactment of § 4(f) of the Federal Aid to
Highways Act71 and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1970.72 Amendments to the Highways Act preclude construction
of federally funded highways through parklands unless there are
no feasible and prudent alternatives, and the proposed program
includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park.
460 U.S. 300 (1983).
16 U.S.C. § 718(d) (2000).
See North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 304 (explaining the Prairie Pothole regions of the
Dakotas, Minnesota, and Montana are critical breeding grounds of North American waterfowl). See also Denis Binder, Taking v. Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of
Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLORIDA L. REV. 1, 22 (1972).
67 16 U.S.C. § 715(f) (2000).
68 See North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 305.
69 Id. at 312.
70 Id. at 314.
71 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000).
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1994).
64
65
66
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NEPA, of course, requires the preparation of an environmental
impact statement on any major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.73 Section 4(f) was enacted in 196474 and NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970.
The state attempted to avoid § 4(f) by splitting the highway
into three sections with only the middle section going through
parkland. Texas did not wish to prepare an environmental impact
statement or comply with the conditions of § 4(f).
The state tried to avoid the conflict by offering to fully fund
the highway itself. The Court of Appeals rejected the state’s approach, holding the road became a federal project once the Secretary of Transportation authorized federal participation in the
project on August 30, 1970.75 The court held the state could not
subvert the Supremacy Clause “by a mere change in bookkeeping
or by shifting funds from one project to another”76 even though no
federal funds had yet exchanged hands. As a result, the state voluntarily submitted itself to federal law:
It entered with its eyes open, having more than adequate warning of the controversial nature of the project and of the applicable law. And while this marriage between the federal and state
defendants seems to have been an unhappy one, it has produced
an already huge concrete offspring whose existence it is impossible for us to ignore.77

Congress ultimately resolved the siting dispute through enactment of legislation, which enabled the city and state to construct
the highway segment without federal funds.78
If we are to respect the core values of federalism, then states
need the right to withdraw their consent. If a statutory scheme
does not expressly provide for revocation, then courts should imply the right of rescission as a fundamental tenet of federalism.
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Much of the prominent federal environmental regulatory
regime is premised on the concept of “cooperative federalSee 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000).
The long-standing dispute over Brackenridge Park was the impetus for the enactment of § 4(f). See Stanley D. Olesh, The Roads Through Our Ruins: Archaeology and
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 155, 158-59
(1986).
75 Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc’y v. Texas Highway Dep’t, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
76 Id. at 1027.
77 Id. at 1028. The courts were also unsympathetic to another attempt to “de-federalize” a highway project in an effort to circumvent NEPA. See Scottsdale Mall v. Indiana,
549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977).
78 See LEWIS F. FISHER, SAVING SAN ANTONIO 331 (1996). Ironically, the freeway was
named in 1981 as one of the three most attractive urban expressways in the nation. Id. at
333.
73
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ism”79 in which the federal and state governments share regulatory duties.80 Congress enacts an environmental regulatory statute, such as the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, pursuant to
which Congress delegates enforcement to a federal agency, such
as the Environmental Protection Agency. A state may then assume much of the primary regulatory and enforcement powers
under the statute, including the day-to-day administration of the
statute, if the state satisfies procedural and substantive standards
set by Congress. Indeed, the state essentially manages its own
pollution control regime and regulatory program.
The federal government retains concurrent and residual
power as well as supervisory or oversight authority. This model
reflects the national concern about controlling pollution and recognizes the historic police powers of the states to control pollution.
A state so empowered under cooperative federalism may enforce higher standards than the minimal standards mandated by
Congress.81 However, many states responded to their delegated
powers by enacting legislation precluding agencies from promulgating rules more stringent than the minimal federal
requirements.82
Cooperative federalism is accomplished by a “carrot-andstick” approach. Benefits to the state include local control, awareness of local problems, and perhaps an infusion of cash. Several of
these statutes condition the receipt of federal funds upon adoption
of plans acceptable to the federal government. The stick consists
of the federal government assuming all the regulatory and enforcement powers if the state demurs. The state would then have
no discretion in how the program is to be implemented or administered. The federal statute and ensuing regulatory program would
also preempt contrary state action pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.83
Implicit in cooperative federalism is the freedom of a state to
decide for itself if it wishes to participate in the regulatory pro79 See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal
Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996)
80 Statutes subject to cooperative federalism include the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) (1986), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1999),
Resource Conservation and recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1995), Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (1991), Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1253 (1986), and the Underground Storage Tank Program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6991b(h)(7)(A) (1995).
81 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1995); Clean Water Act § 510, 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (1986).
82 See James M. McElfish, Jr., Minimal Stringency: Abdication of State Innovation, 25
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (Jan. 1995).
83 U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
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gram.84 The Tenth Amendment85 does not bar cooperative federalism because the federal government may often directly regulate
the activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Congress may induce a state to cooperate by offering financial incentives and other
favors and exacting financial penalties and other disincentives
from recalcitrant states.86
The freedom of states to decide if they will participate goes to
the essence of federalism.87 States have selectively exercised their
discretion in different ways rather than be subject to a monolithic
national government dictating uniformity. Thus, while states
rushed to participate in the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,
many states have not similarly participated in OSHA.88
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act illustrate the interaction of cooperative federalism, immunity and the Spending
Clause. Virginia sought review of an EPA decision disapproving
the state’s proposed program for issuing air pollution permits.89
The gist of the EPA’s decision was that Virginia’s proposal lacked
adequate provisions for judicial review of Virginia’s permit decisions. The sanctions imposed by the 1990 amendments include
the loss of federal highway funds in non-attainment areas.90 The
court of appeals held Congress lacked the power to infringe upon
the core of sovereignty retained by the states, including the administration of their judicial systems.91 However, the court also
held that the Clean Air Act’s judicial reviewability rules did not
See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937).
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
86 See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness sub. nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per
curiam); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
87 See Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589.
88 See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulations: A
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the
States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1268 (1995) (explaining that although 40 states operate delegated National Pollution Discharge Effluent Systems (NPDES) permit authority under the
Clean Water Act, only two implement § 404 programs). Conversely, 22 states, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands have OSHA-approved state programs, and an additional three, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York have rules that cover only the public sector. The participating states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. OSHA, State
Occupational Safety and Health Plans (visited Feb. 12, 2001) <http://www.osha-slc.gov/fso/
osp/>.
89 See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996).
90 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1) (2000). Non-attainment areas are those that have not
achieved the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which define the level of air quality
necessary to protect the public health and welfare. These standards exist for a number of
pollutants, such as ozone (smog), carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and nitrogen dioxide. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a) (ozone), 7512 (carbon monoxide), 7513 (particulate matter), and 7514 (nitrogen dioxide).
91 See Browner, 80 F.3d at 879.
84
85
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cross the forbidden constitutional line because they did not compel
the states to change their rules, but only induced them to do so.92
The court upheld the highway sanctions provision on two
grounds: the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause. The
conditions were reasonably related to the goal of reducing air pollution and did not rise to the level of “outright coercion.”93 The
state was free not to participate, leaving the full regulatory program to the federal government.94 The Clean Air Amendments
simply followed a well-established pattern of cooperative
federalism.95
USE

OF THE

SPENDING CLAUSE

FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

If Congress can address environmental problems directly
through the Commerce Clause, then its power through the Spending Clause is superfluous. The only role for the Spending Clause
then is to serve as an added inducement to states to voluntarily
assent to federal programs, including the critical enforcement
powers, and provide an illusion of state concurrence. If, as Lopez
and Morrison indicate, the Commerce Clause has reached its limits, then the Spending Clause becomes of critical importance.
If the Spending Clause continues to be construed to extend
the reach of the federal government beyond the limits of the other
enumerated powers in the Constitution, then Congress may continue to rely upon the spending power to achieve broad environmental goals, which might otherwise be constitutionally
questionable. However, Congress has not, with the major exception of the Federal Aid to Highways Act, extensively relied upon
the Spending Clause to achieve such goals.
Congress’s powers under the Spending Clause to effectuate
environmental goals can be illustrated by two wetlands cases.
The Supreme Court held in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers96 that the Corps
lacked regulatory power over isolated wetlands because the exercise of such power was beyond the scope of the statute. The familiar 5-4 majority did not address the Commerce Clause issue, but
resolved the case on the basis of statutory interpretation. The effect of Solid Waste Agency is to renew attention on the Spending
Clause.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 881 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
Id. at 882.
See generally Jeffrey Geiger, Note, Canary in a Coal Mine? Federalism and the
Failure of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. & POL’Y REV. 81
(1995); William J. Klein, Note, Pressure or Compulsion? Federal Highway Fund Sanctions
of the Clean Air Act of 1990, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 885 (1995).
96 121 S. Ct. 675 (Jan. 9, 2001).
92
93
94
95
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A court of appeals reached a contrary result in United States
v. Dierckman,97 which involved 15 acres of “converted” wetlands
within the meaning of the “Swampbuster” provisions of the Food
Security Act.98 Farmers are ineligible for United States Department of Agriculture food subsidies if they “convert” a wetland by
draining, dredging, filling, leveling or other means for the purpose
of producing commodities.
The farmer argued the land involved did not affect interstate
commerce. The court held the Food Security Act was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause rather than the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, the Swampbuster provision is not limited to activities
affecting interstate commerce.99
As a practical matter, states will not reject large sums of
money offered by Congress unless the conditions are unduly repressive. Professor Epstein reasons because the states’ taxpayers
are already paying into the federal treasury, the pressure to return some of these funds will be great, especially since the citizens
of neighboring states would be receiving and benefiting from these
funds.100
Congress has realized that because federal funds account for
ninety-five percent of a state’s transportation budget, highway
funds provide the leverage for Congress to achieve its goals. For
example, $4,619,112,289 in highway funds was certified for the
2000 fiscal year, with the largest sum, $437,310,349 going to California.101 These sums serve as an irresistible lure to the states,
even with substantial conditions attached.
As we have seen, South Dakota,102 Nevada,103 and Virginia104
sued to invalidate conditions attached to the receipt of federal
highway trust funds. However, upon losing their suits, the states
promptly complied with the conditions. Federal funds trumped
state principles.
Thus, Congress has used the funds as leverage to impose a
national speed limit,105 a minimum national drinking age of
twenty-one,106 and air pollution conditions, as seen by the EPA’s
201 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2000).
16 U.S.C §§ 3801-34 (1994).
See Dierckman, 201 F.3d at 922.
See Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending: The Role of Legal and Equitable
Remedies, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001).
101 See FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Revised Apportionment of
Fiscal Year 2000 National Highway System Funds (2000) (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/notices/n4510432.htm>.
102 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
103 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F. 2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
104 See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996).
105 See Skinner, 884 F. 2d at 446 (the much derided 55 mph speed limit, which was
ultimately repealed by Congress).
106 See Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
97
98
99
100
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prohibition of federal highway funding by the Secretary of Transportation to states maintaining non-attainment areas.107 Congress in 2000 further conditioned receipt of up to 8% of federal
highway funds on the enactment by states of a .08 blood alcohol
level for drunk driving purposes.108
The Clean Water Act can similarly be used to advance environmental goals. The government grants available under its various programs are quite large.109 For example, The Public Water
Systems Supervision Program Grants for the fiscal year 2000 are
estimated to be $99,013,000,110 the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund is $1,196,317, 000,111 and the Clean Water State Revolving Fund is $1,190,968,000.112 These sums, similar to those of the
Federal Aid to Highway Act, will be very attractive to states.
If Congress chooses to entice states by offering large sums of
money through programs such as the Clean Water Act or the Federal Aid to Highways Act, then Congress can achieve three major
purposes.
First, states can be induced into directly enforcing federal
statutes—an amplification of the existing cooperative federalism
scheme.
Second, Congress can indirectly extend federal jurisdiction
through the states to regulate activities that would otherwise exceed the reach of the Commerce Clause. An example would be the
use of “wetlands preservation grants” to protect isolated wetlands.
The third effect would be to have states waive their Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, opening themselves up to environmental citizen suits.
CONCLUSION
The next few years will witness a reassessment of the federal
role in environmental protection. The changes may be great or
minor depending upon the further unfolding of the federalism debate in the Supreme Court and political circles.
The recent emphasis on the Eleventh Amendment, accompanied by the narrowing of the scope of the Commerce Clause, necessitates a reappraisal of Congressional constitutional authority to
protect the environment. Broad statutes of general application,
42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m) (2000).
See, McConville, supra note 40 at 151.
For example, Congress appropriated $33.2 billion from 1972 to 1981 under the construction grants program for municipal wastewater treatment plants. U.S. COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 74-75 (1981).
110 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: BUDGET INFORMATION FOR STATES 150 (2000).
111 Id. at 152.
112 Id. at 153.
107
108
109
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such as the Clean Air or Clean Water Acts, CERCLA, and RCRA,
will be upheld in their application to interstate activities. Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Lopez v. United States113 cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.114 for the principle
that where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.115
However, the problem arises in the application of such broad
statutes to problems of tangential connection to interstate commerce, such as isolated wetlands116 and isolated species,117 where
no overt or substantial effect on interstate commerce is
discernible.
By making almost all of the environmental statutes dependent on one clause, albeit a broad clause of the Constitution, Congress has placed at risk many environmental statutes.
If the Commerce Clause applies, then the Spending Clause is
superfluous. If, however, the Commerce Clause does not encompass such environmentally sensitive matters as isolated wetlands
or species, then Congress may still accomplish these goals by attaching conditions to federal funds. The conditions can also result
in the waiver of a state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. States would need to be clearly informed of the conditions
attached to the federal funds; specifically, any waivers of sovereign immunity and the conditions upon which a state may rescind
its consent.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (Jan. 9, 2001).
117 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
113
114
115
116

